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COMMENTS
various aforementioned jurisdictions in substantiating their dec-
larations of its constitutionality."
In 1944 Louisiana extended the use of the short form to all
indictable offenses included in the Criminal Code of 1942. Ex-
tensive jurisprudence establishes the constitutionality of the
forms provided by the 1928 enactment, and there is every reason
to believe, that the 1944 amendment will be similarly construed.
The latter accomplishes the same purpose by the same means.
The accused may get specific details by a bill of particulars just
as he could under the legislation of 1928. The form may be slight-
ly' different, but the substance and purpose remain constant.
ROBERT I. BROUSSARD
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE COVERAGE UNDER
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The theory of the workmen's compensation acts is that
industry should bear the loss of workmen and their families
occasioned by injuries and death occurring in the employment.
At first the acts comprehended only accidental injuries. As indus-
try became more complex there developed an active need for the
inclusion of industrial diseases. When the public began to under-
stand and accept the idea of employer liability in the field of
industrial accidents the demand grew for such inclusion. The
demand has been met differently by the respective jurisdictions.
Compensation has been allowed by express legislation in some
states, while in others the courts construe the act to comprehend
occupational diseases. There are yet a considerable number of
states that have made no provision for the coverage of industrial
diseases.
The phrase "injury by accident" was taken from the original
English Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897.1 This was at first
interpreted rigidly by the English courts to mean only traumatic
injuries. 2 Since Fenton v. Thorley & Company, Limited,3 how-
ever, the term has been extended by the courts. There compensa-
55. Alabama-Ala. Code (Michie, 1940) tit. 15, § 259; Illinois-Ill. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 38, § 716; New Jersey-N.J. Stat. Ann. (1939)
§ 2:188; Texas-Tex. Ann. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1926) art. 409; West Vir-
ginia-W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 6263 et seq.; Wisconsin--Wis. Stat.
(1943) § 355.21 et seq.
1. 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37, § 1 (1897).
2. Steel v. Cammell, Laird & Co., Ltd. [1905] 2 K.B. 232.
3. [1903] A.C. 443.
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tion was allowed to a workman who in the ordinary performance
of his work was ruptured. A further extension was made in*
Clover, Clayton & Company, Limited v. Hughes,4 by holding that
the bursting of an artery while the workman was tightening a
nut, due to advanced aneurism, constituted an accident. In a
more recent case 5 recovery was allowed for a "dropped foot"
which resulted from intense pressure on the peroneal nerve due
to constant working in a crouched position. The court held that
the injury constituted an accident. As a much quoted writer has
said, "Since the case of Fenton v. Thorley, nothing more is
required than that the harm that the plaintiff has sustained shall
be unexpected. It is no longer required that the causes external
to the plaintiff himself, which contribute to bring about his
injury, shall be in any way unusual." England now has schedule
of specified diseases which are compensable. 7
In this country there is a marked lack of uniformity with
respect to coverage of occupational disease. Varied results have
been produced by statutory differences as well as by differences
in the attitudes of the courts in interpreting the several work-
men's compensation acts.
The states appear to fall into three groups with respect to
their attitudes toward industrial disease: (1) those states where
compensation is afforded for a limited group of occupational dis-
eases; (2) those states where by either comprehensive legislation
or liberal court attitudes universal coverage for occupational dis-
eases is afforded; (3) those states where no express statutory
provision for occupational disease has been made, and the court
decisions vary with respect to coverage through more or less
liberal interpretations of the term "accident," or "injury."
States Allowing Recovery for Specific Occupational Diseases
In thirteen states" statutory provision has been made for
specific groups of compensable diseases. The diseases recognized
4. [1910] A.C. 242.
5. Fife Coal Co. Ltd. v. Young [1940] A.C. 479.
6. Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts
(1912) 25 Harv. L. Rev. 328, 339.
7. 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 84 (1925).
8. Arizona: Ariz.-Code Ann. (Supp. 1943) § 56-1236; Arkansas: Ark. Act
319 of 1939; Delaware: Dela. Acts of 1937, c. 241; Idahb: Idaho Sess. Laws of
1939, c. 21, § 43-2103; Kentucky: Ky. Stat. Ann. (Carroll, 1936) § 4880; Mary-
land: Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1939) art. 101, § 34; Michigan: Mich. Acts of
1937, c. 61, § 2; New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. (1940) tit. 34, c. 15, § 31; North
Carolina: N.C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1935) § 8081(2); Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat.
Ann. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 77, § 1102; Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c.
300, art. vii, § 2; Washington: Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp.
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as coming under the workmen's compensation acts vary from one9
to thirty-four' Pennsylvania in 1937 adopted an occupational
disease act complete in itself, designating twelve diseases."
Arkansas enacted its first workmen's compensation act in 1939.
Injury was defined as "accidental injury or death arising out of
and in the course of employment, and such. occupational disease
or occupational infection as arises naturally out of such employ-
ment or as naturally and unavoidably results from such accidental
injury. '12 All diseases would appear to be covered by this defini-
tion, but a later section enumerates several diseases with the
provision, that they alone would be deemed occupational. 3
An interesting innovation is found. in the workmen's com-
pensation act of Washington. Prior to 1941, recovery for occupa-
tional disease was limited to twenty-two specific diseases. 4 In
that year, however, the legislature adopted an amendment go as
to include "such disease or infection as arises naturally and proxi-
mately out of extra-hazardous employment. '15 (Italics supplied).
Thus there is comprehensive coverage for occupational disease in
certain types of employment only. In other employments recovery
is allowed only for designated disorders, as set forth above.
States Providing Comprehensive Coverage for Occupational
Disease
New York and Ohio have inserted clauses in their respective
acts which seem to place these states in the "complete coverage"
category. 6 After setting out twenty-seven diseases, the New York
act simply adds, "any and all occupational diseases." Ohio by a
special amendment in 1939 made a similar addition to its schedule.
Minnesota, Nebraska, and Oregon by their 1943 amendments
brought the number of states allowing comprehensive coverage
1940) § 7679-1; West Virginia; W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 1943)
§ 2545(10).
9. Ky. Stat. Ann. (Carroll Baldwin, 1 ed. 1942) § 342.005 (included poison
by gas in mines); W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 1943) § 2545(10) (deal-
ing with silicosis).
10. Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1939) art. 101, § 34 (the act sets out 34 diseases
and the occupation in which the disease is acquired).
11. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 77, § 1102. Michigan also has a
separate occupational disease act. Mich. Acts of 1937, c. 6, § 2.
12. Ark. Act 319 of 1939, § 2(f).
13. Id. at § 14(a)(5). Section 43(12) of the same act seems to recognize
the possibility of additions to the list. Delaware has just recently made such
an addition. 43 Laws of Delaware (1943) c. 269, § 10.
14. Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. 1940) § 7679-1.
15. Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. 1941) § 7679-1.




of industrial disease to fourteen.17 Two states' s within this group
have occupational disease acts separate from their workmen's
compensation acts. In California's original act the term injury
expressly included injury or disease arising out of the employ-
ment.19 A special amendment 20 was required to compensate for
heart trouble and pneumonia.
Massachusetts and Iowa developed comprehensive coverage
for occupational disease through the adoption by their courts of
a liberal interpretation of the term "personal injury." The stat-
utes in these states, unlike many others, did not restrict coverage
to accidents. Hence an opportunity was afforded for a liberal
attitude on the part of the courts. In Massachusetts, recovery
has been allowed for dermatitis, 2' lead poisoning,22 blindness, 18
and silicosis,24 all of which developed over a comparatively long
period of employment. Somewhat arbitrarily, however, the court
of that state refused to include neurosis25 resulting from posture
and tuberculosis 26 contracted by a nurse in the course of her
duties at a hospital. In both cases it was announced that coverage
was not intended where there was a gradual breakdown of bodily
tissues. These arbitrary limitations were alleviated in 1941 when
the legislature of Massachusetts provided comprehensive statu-
tory coverage for all occupational diseases.
2'
The Iowa Supreme Court after a thorough review of the his-
torical background of the workmen's compensation act and the
cases decided in other jurisdictions held in the leading case of
17. California: Calif. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1931) act 4749; Connecticut:
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 5226; Illinois: Ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, Supp.
1943) c. 48, §§ 172.1-172.35); Indiana: Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1943)
§ 40-2201--40-2204; Iowa: Iowa Code (1935) §§ 1361-1422; Massachusetts:
Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 152, § 26; Minnesota: Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp.
1944) § 4326(h); Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) § 3695; Nebraska:
Neb. Act 230 of 1943, c. 113, § 2; New York: N.Y. Workmen's Compensation
Law § 3; North Dakota: N.D. Laws of 1935, c. 286, § 1; Ohio: Ohio Gen. Code
(Page, Supp. 1942) § 1465-68a; Oregon: Ore. Laws of 1943, c. 442; Wisconsin:
Wis. Stat. (1939) § 102.01.
18. Illinois and Indiana.
19. Calif. Stats. of 1917, c. 586, § 1(4).
20. Calif. Stats. of 1943, c. 255.
21. Wentworth's Case, 284 Mass. 479, 188 N.E. 237 (1933); Robinson's Case,
299 Mass. 499, 13 N.E.(2d) 392 (1938).
22. Johnson v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., Ltd., 217 Mass. 388,
104 N.E. 735 (1914); O'Donnell's Case, 237 Mass. 164, 133 N.E. 621 (1921).
23. In re Hurle, 217 Mass. 223, 104 N.E. 336 (1914).
24. Sullivan's Case, 265 Mass. 497, 164 N.E. 457 (1929); Fabrizio's Case, 274
Mass. 352, 174 N.E. 702 (1931); Langford's Case, 278 Mass. 461, 180 N.E. 228
(1932); De Filippo's Case, 284 Mass. 531, 188 N.E. 245 (1933); Gustafson's Case,
303 Mass. 397, 21 N.E.(2d) 961 (1939).
25. In re Maggelet, 228 Mass. 57, 116 N.E. 972 (1917).
26. Smith's Case, 307 Mass. 516, 30 N.E.(2d) 536 (1940).
27. Mass. Acts of 1941, c. 437(7A).
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Almquist v. Shenandoah Nurseries that the injury need not arise
out of an accident.2 8 It was said in that case that Iowa would
follow the lead of Massachusetts and give a liberal interpretation
to the act.
Silicosis is given special treatment in fourteen states. 29 This
particular lung disease is contracted by breathing air containing
silica dust in minute particles. The characteristic symptoms of
silicosis and tuberculosis are very similar; victims of the former
disease are peculiarly susceptible to the latter.2 0 Perhaps the
reason for special attention to silicosis is the difficulty of ascer-
taining how much of the disability may be attributable to other
pulmonary ailments. A West Virginia statute, however, allows
compensation for silicosis even if accompanied by tuberculosis. 31
It is submitted that tuberculosis contracted in such manner could
correctly be labelled an occupational disease. In some states it is
required that an employee work in the same employment for a
prescribed period before he can receive compensation for silicosis.
This provision has been construed by the West Virginia court to
mean the same type of employment, not necessarily under the
same employer.
3 2
The statutes relating to silicosis present the courts with the
problem of determining what is a disablement; also what is an
exposure and when and where does it take place? In Indiana
disablement has been defined by the courts as the incapacity to
earn full wages in the work in which the employee was last
exposed.22 In that state an exposure of less than sixty days is not
compensable.3 4 In Illinois, which has a similar statute, it has been
held that the employment must be sixty days but the employee
need not have been actually exposed during all that time2 5 A
dictum in an Illinois case was to the effect that when the employee
28. Almqulst v. Shenandoah Nurseries, 218 Iowa 724, 254 N.W. 85 (1934).
Accord: Gay v. Hocking Coal Co., 184 Iowa 949, 169 N.W. 360 (1918); Hughes
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 192 Iowa 947, 185 N.W. 614 (1921); Farrow v. What
Cheer Clay Products Co., 198 Iowa 922, 200 N.W. 625 (1924); Dille v. Plain-
view Coal Co., 217 Iowa 827, 250 N.W. 607 (1933).
29. Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin.
30. Sayers and Jones, Silicosis and Dust Diseases, Medical Aspects and
Control (1936) 1, 2 (published by the Division of Industrial Hygiene, United
States Public Health Service, No. B-1345).
31. W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 1943) § 2545(10).
32. Hodges v. Workmen's Compensation Com'r, 123 W.Va. 563, 17 S.E.(2d)
450 (1941).
33. In re Jeffries, 14 N.E.(2d) 751 (Ind. App. 1938).
34. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1943) § 40-2226.




leaves his work after sixty days to accept other employment, the
first employer remains liable until there has been sufficient
exposure to render the second employer liable.3
One of the most difficult problems in the occupational disease
states is the determination as to which of successive employers
shall be held. Generally the last employer is responsible. Penn-
sylvania relieves him of some liability by establishing an "occu-
pational disease fund. '3 7 The compensation for any occupational
disease that develops after an exposure of five years or more is
paid jointly by the commonwealth and the employer. The courts
of California apportion the payment of compensation among the
successive employers. 8 This would seem to be the most equitable
solution. The apportioning of the loss should be made relative to
the time each profited by the employee's service. Those who con-
tribute to the exposure should contribute to the compensation.
The problems of administration are many but they can be solved
by legislatures and sympathetic courts.
The acts with scheduled lists probably offer the simpler
problems. The chief fault with such acts is that no schedule covers
all known occupational diseases, and newly discovered diseases
cannot of course be enumerated.
States Which Have No Express Coverage for Occupational
Disease
The states" that retain the terminology of the original Eng-
lish act place the courts in the position of having to refuse
recovery for injuries that cannot be classed as "accidental." The
term "by accident" is construed generally to mean an unexpected
event happening suddenly. Included in that is the requirement
that the injury be traceable to a definite occurrence at a specific
time and place. Since industrial diseases are of slow growth, are
expectable, and are not traceable to a definite event, it is difficult
to bring them under this definition. As one court has said, "'In
occupational diseases it is drop by drop, it is little by little, day
after day for weeks and months and finally enough is accumulated
36. Morris Metal Products Co. v. Industrial Commission, 370 Ill. 292, 297,
18 N.E.(2d) 899, 902 (1939).
37. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1943) § 1408.
38. Blanchard v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 68 Cal. App. 65, 228 Pac. 359
(1924); Associated Indemnity Corp. v. State Industrial Acc. Comm., 12 P.(2d)
1075 (Cal. App. 1932); Limited Mutual Compensation Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Acc. Commission, 98 P.(2d) 827 (Cal. App. 1940).
. 39. Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 'and Wyoming.
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to produce symptoms.''-4o The courts' efforts to allow compensa-
tion whenever possible have led them to use very entangling
language. They initiate their discussion with the statement that
the statute does not allow compensation for "occupational dis-
ease." They then attempt to define this term so as to exclude the
ailment for which compensation is claimed. A frequently quoted
definition is the following which is found in an Iowa decision:
"An 'occupational disease' . . . as distinguished from a disease
caused or superinduced by an actionable wrong or injury, is
neither more nor less than a disease which is the usual incident
or result of the particular employment in which the workman
is engaged, as distinguished from one which is caused or
brought about by the employer's failure in his duty to furnish
him a safe place to work."'"
The weakness in the above definition lies in the fact that a disease
acquired over a period of years may be compensated for as an
accidental injury if the employer has failed to exercise reasonable
care;4 2 yet there would be no compensation for the same type of
injury if the employer were not negligent. 43 Thus the element of
negligence appears in the workmen's compensation cases wher6 it
has no place. A more concise definition' is one from a Utah
decision:
"if the illness is one commonly recognized as incident to the
particular occupation, it is an occupational disease. The time
taken for the effects of the occupation to become serious is not
the governing factor. Some are less resistant to imperfect
conditions than others.
' 44
Whether the respective courts formulate their own definitions or
borrow from each other they find them difficult to apply. This
situation works an injustice on both the court and the workmen
seeking recovery.
40. Adams v. Acme White Lead & Color Works, 182 Mich. 157, 160, 148 N.W.
485, 486 (1914).
41. Gay v. Hocking Coal Co., 184 Iowa 949, 956, 169 N.W. 360, 363 (1918).
See Seattle Can Co. v. Department of Labor and Industries of Washington,
147 Wash. 303, 265 Pac. 739 (1928); Polson Logging Co. v. Kelly, 195 Wash. 167,
80 P.(2d) 412 (1938).
42. McNeely v. Carolina Asbestos Co., 206 N.C. 568, 174 S.E. 509 (1934).
43. Swink v. Carolina Asbestos Co., 210 N.C. 303, 186 S.E. 258 (1936). The
effect of this case and the McNeely case (supra note 42) has been minimized
by the inclusion of statutory coverage for occupational disease In North
Carolina In 1935 [N.C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1935) § 8081(2)].
44. Young v. Salt Lake City, 97 Utah 123, 128, 90 P. (2d) 174, 176 (1939).
1944]
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Compensation has been allowed for pneumonia where this
disease resulted from a long continuous exposure to cold water,4 5
inhalation of gas,4 6 a series of sudden changes of temperature,4 7
a damp basement,48 heat exhaustion, 4 as well as to sudden unex-
pected exposure, 50 or a fall.51 But recovery has been refused where
the disease was contracted because of ordinary exposure,52 changes
in temperature,13 or heat exhaustion.54 In denying compensation
to an employee for pneumonia the Kansas court said:
"Lowered vitality may also come from exhaustion from heavy
work, from fatigue, from long hours of work and from a
great variety of other causes which expose a workman to
pneumonia and other diseases. The result is there is a twilight
zone between clear personal injury by accident, which is cov-
ered by the Compensation Act and sickness which is not
covered.
'55
The Texas court spared no efforts to find that pneumonia was the
result of an accident. The workman had been continuously
exposed to sulfur dioxide which so weakened the lungs that
pneumonia developed.86 Such an infection, reasoned the court,
naturally developed from a physical injury to the lungs. The
inhalation of the gas in presence of moisture contained in the
lungs became sulphuric acid which destroyed the membrane.
Such an infection was considered analogous to the infection of an
external wound by other noxious germs. The courts of New
Mexico and Colorado give "accident" a similar construction. In
Stevenson v. Lee Moor Contracting Company,57 a recent case, the
45. Pow v. Southern Construction Co., 235 Ala. 580, 180 So. 288 (1938). See
New River Coal Co. v. Files, 215 Ala. 64, 109 So. 360 (1926); Gulf States Creo-
soting Co. v. Walker, 224 Ala. 104, 139 So. 261 (1932).
46. Columbine Laundry Co. v. Industrial Commission, 73 Colo. 397, 215
Pac. 870 (1923).
47. Johnson v. Industrial Commission, 63 Ohio App. 544, 27 N.E.(2d) 418
(1939).
48. Roth v. Locust Mountain State Hospital, 130 Pa. Sup. 1, 196 Atl. 924
(1938).
49. Dupre v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 98 Conn. 646, 120 Atl. 288 (1923).
50. Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Swanson, 93 Colo. 354, 26 P.(2d)
107 (1933).
51. A. Breslauer Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 167 Wis. 202,
167 N.W. 256 (1918).
52. Joyce v. Luse-Stevenson Co., 346 Mo. 58, 139 S.W.(2d) 918 (1940).
53. Lux v. Western Casualty Co., 107 F.(2d) 1002 (C.C.A. 5th, 1939).
54. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Clark, 140 S.W.(2d) 890 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
55. Hoag v. Kansas Independent Laundry, 113 Kan. 513, 516, 215 Pac. 295,
296 (1923).
56. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Broadway, 110 F.(2d) 357 (C.C.A. 5th,
1940). See also Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Jones, 80 F.(2d) 680
(C.C.A. 5th, 1935).
57. 45 N.M. 354, 115 P.(2d) 342 (1941).
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New Mexico court stated that it was unnecessary that the injury
should result momentarily in order to be accidental. "It may be
the result of hours, even a day, or longer, of breathing or inhaling
gases, depending upon the facts of the case. '58 The workman in
that case had developed pneumonia traceable to seven hours of
dusty truck driving. In other states with statutes substantially
like New Mexico there is a marked tendency to construe accident
as referring to the injury and not to the cause of the injury.59
That is, an employee is entitled to compensation when the injury
was unexpected though the event that caused it may have been
normal. The Arizona courts however adopt the contrary view
and hold that the event causing the injury must be undesigned,
sudden and unexpected.6 0 Since pneumonia is apt to be contracted
under ordinary circumstances recovery is usually denied.
In Oklahoma the court distinguishes accident from disease
on the ground that the former arises by reason of some definite
event, the date of which can be fixed with certainty.6 ' In allowing
compensation for injuries resulting from inhaling gases it said:
"Under the evidence, the condition of claimant was probably
progressively brought about by the inhalation of gas fumes and
dust for a period of time, but on a definite and specified date he
went to work as usual and after working a short time became
suddenly ill and Was unable to work further. The evidence is
that on this certain date he had reached his limit and that the
breathing of the gas fumes and coke dust on this particular occa-
sion was the existing cause of his present condition." 6 It is not
believed that the courts of Arizona under the above definition
established in that state would have reached the same conclusion.
Under the Oklahoma rule recovery could be had for almost any
occupational disease. The Colorado statute has received a similar
construction. Compensation has been allowed to workmen who
were poisoned by dope used to spray airplanes,6 3 who were
blinded while working near welding operations, 64 or who were
58. 45 N.M. 354, 367, 115 P.(2d) 342, 350. See also Webb v. New Mexico
Publishing Co., 47 N.M. 279, 141 P.(2d) 333 (1943) (used injurious soap six
months; held series of traumatic injuries).
59. Georgia, Maine, South Carolina, Tennessee, Wyoming, and Utah.
60. Pierce v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 42 Ariz. 436, 26 P.(2d) 1017 (1933).
61. F. A. Gillespie & Sons Co. v. Johnson, 160 Okla. 222, 16 P.(2d) 870
(1932); Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Guthrie, 167 Okla. 83, 27 P.(2d) 814 (1933).
62. Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Guthrie, 167 Okla. 83, 84, 27 P.(2d) 814, 816
(1933).
63. Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Ule, 97 Colo. 253, 48 P.(2d) 803
(1935).
64. Great American Indemnity Co. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 108
Colo. 323, 116 P.(2d) 919 (1941).
1944]
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injured from flying dust.65 In this last instance recovery was
allowed even though the complainant, a warehouseman, was
scraping dirt off equipment where continuous exposure to grit
was characteristic of his employment. This follows the courts'
frequent statement that workmen's compensation statutes are to
be liberally construed so as to accomplish their beneficent pur-
pose. 6
The cases dealing with injuries from inhalation of gas seem
to depend upon whether or not asphyxiation can be attributed
to a single incident. In one case a miner was making an opening
into a room where workmen had been blasting. Due to insufficient
ventilation the current containing the gas passed through the
opening. The resultant injury was accidental.,7 In the same state
an employee had on several occasions worked in an unventilated
room containing gas, and the injury was regarded as an occupa-
tional disease .6  Disablement of an electric refrigerator repair-
man by methyl chloride gas was similarly treated."'
In the majority of the non-occupational disease states the
courts designate lead poisoning as a disease. Prior to the adop-
tion of an occupational disease statute in 1943 the courts of Ore-
gon denied compensation for a severe case of lead poisoning
which developed over a period of seven weeks .7 Utah considered
a fifteen day period sufficient to make lead poisoning occupa-
tional.7 1 However, in an interesting case where an employee had
used "litharge"7 over a period of four years, the Idaho court
called the resulting disease an accident. 73 The decision was based
on a previous case which had held that lead poisoning acquired
by the complainant after three weeks as a lead burner was not
an occupational disease.7 4 In that case the plaintiff was a carpen-
65. Hallenbeck v. Butler, 101 Colo. 486, 74 P.(2d) 708 (1937).
66. Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 64 Colo. 480,
174 Pac. 689 (1918).
67. New River Coal Co. v. Files, 215 Ala. 64, 109 So. 360 (1926).
68. Gentry v. Swann Chemical Co., 234 Ala. 313, 174 So. 530 (1937). (This
case came under Alabama's Employers' Liability Act. [Ala. Code Ann. (1940)
c. 6, tit. 26, § 826]. The act makes the employer liable for personal Injuries
due to defects in ways, works, machinery or plant. Other states have com-
pensated for injuries resulting from poisonous gases: Jackson v. Euclid-Pine
Inv. Co., 233 Mo. App. 805, 22 S.W.(2d) 849 (1930); Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor
Co., 328 Mo. 112, 40 S.W.(2d) 601 (1931); Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 56 Utah 80, 189 Pac. 69 (1920).
69. Birmingham Electric Co. v. Meacham, 27 Ala. App. 471, 175 So. 316
(1 37), affirmed in 234 Ala. 506, 175 So. 322 (1937).
70. Iwanicki v. State Industrial Acc. Commission, 104 Ore. 650, 205 Pac.
990 (1922).
71. Young v. Salt Lake City, 97 Utah 123, 90 P.(2d) 174 (1939).
72. Lead Protoxide-PbO.
73. Wozniak v. Stoner Meat Co., 57 Idaho 439, 65 P.(2d) 768 (1937).
74. Ramsay v. Sullivan Mining Co., 512 Idaho 366, 6 P.(2d) 856 (1631).
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ter and the court said a disease to be occupational must result
from a person's occupation or "calling." The Maryland courts
had departed from the general rule that poisonings by lead and
similar substances were occupational diseases until the difficulty
was obviated by a special statute. In Victory Sparkler & Specialty
Company v. Francks,7 5 it was held that exposure to phosphorus
poisoning while making fireworks was an accidental injury. In
that decision it was said:
"It was by chance that the employer did not use due care, and
by chance the vapor of phosphorus was where its noxious
foreign particles could be inhaled by the girl. It was by chance
that the inspired air carried these particles into her system,
sickening her, . . . after fortuitously finding a lesion."76
In Virginia the contrary conclusion has been reachedT7 In a case
where an employee inhaled gas causing tuberculosis the Virginia
court said, "It is enough that the employee contract an occupa-
tional disease . . . but the disease must result naturally and
unavoidably from an accident. 1'7 8 The act of that state was mod-
elled after the orginal Indiana act. This latter has already been
amended to cover occupational diseases.
Louisiana
The Louisiana act 9 excludes occupational disease. There
must be a personal injury by accident, which is defined as
follows:
"The word 'accident,' as used in this act shall. .. mean an
unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly or vio-
lently, with or without human fault and producing at the
time objective symptoms of an injury. The terms 'injury' and
'personal injuries' shall include only injuries by violence to
the physical structure of the body and such disease or infection
as naturally result therefrom. The said terms shall in no case
be construed to include any other form of disease or derange-
ment, howsoever caused or contracted."80
75. 147 Md. $68, 128 At. 635 (1925).
76. 147 Md. 368, 379, 128 At. 635, 639 (1925).
77. Turner v. Virginia Fireworks Co., 149 Va. 871, 141 S.E. 142 (1928).
78. Clinchfield Carbocoal Corp. v. Kiser, 139 Va. 451, 124 S.E. 271 (1924).,
79. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 43 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4391-4432].
80. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 88, as amended by La. Act 88 of 1918, 1 1 (Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 4427].
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The courts tend to adopt a liberal construction of the above
statute. The cases indicate two distinct methods of attack by the
courts in fixing the area of overlap between injury and occupa-
tional disease. One determination frequently called for is whether
the disease was contracted suddenly or accumulated over a long
period of time. This does not necessarily mean that a plaintiff
who has been exposed over a long period of time will be denied
recovery. The suddenness of the attack is the determining factor.
The other common determination is whether the disease is usual
to the employment in which the complainant was working when
he sustained the injury. Thus even where the disease is brought
on gradually, if it is not usual to the employment, compensation
may still be allowed. The statutory authority for this latter
distinction is not clear.
The first occasion for passing on the issue of occupational
disease was presented in Cannella v. Gulf Refining Company of
Louisiana.8' In that case compensation was allowed for lead
poisoning. Although the plaintiff had previously worked for
several years painting trucks without injury, he was suddenly
stricken on one occasion. The court distinguished between lead
poisoning gradually accumulating and acute lead poisoning. Med-
ical testimony showed that in acute cases the patient is normal
until a few hours or days of contact with the paint makes him
deathly ill. The court said:
"There is no doubt that the acute lead poisoning from
which the plaintiff suffered was unexpected.... Surely there
was enough evidence of violent injury to the physical structure
of the body and by no process of logical or fair reasoning can
it be said that a person who is suffering from acute poisoning
is afflicted with a disease."82
The opinion quoted at length from Sullivan Mining Company v.
Aschenbach. 3 The quoted case recognized the contrariety of the
holdings on the subject and adopted the more liberal view. In a
case where compensation was sought for dermatitis recovery was
denied. The petitioner had worked four years in a cement dust
filled room and the resulting dermatitis was held to be an occupa-
tional disease.84 The same conclusion was reached where a
81. 154 So. 406 (La. App. 1934).
82. Cannella v. Gulf Refining Co. of La., 154 So. 406, 414 (La. App'. 1934).
83. 33 F.(2d) 1 (C.C.A. 9th, 1929); writ refused 280 U.S. 586, 50 S.Ct. 35, 74
L.Ed. 635 (1929).
84. Freiss v. Lone Star Cement Co., 161 So. 209 (La. App. 1935).
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workman fired furnaces for four years whereby his eyesight was
impaired.85 The court indicated that if there had been proof that
the furnaces produced an unusual glare on the final day when the
ailment culminated it would have allowed compensation.
The liberality of the courts' attitude toward recovery for
occupational disease is well illustrated by the line of cases which
allow recovery for any disease which is not peculiar to the
employment of the plaintiff. The same year in which the Louisi-
ana court decided the Cannella case it sustained a petition which
alleged that the plaintiff's injuries were due to breathing paint
fumes.86 It was stated in the opinion that although occupational
diseases are not compensable, the petitioner's allegation did not
positively characterize the injury as being usual to the occupation
of painting automobiles. A similar attitude has been manifested
on other occasions. It has been held that a callous which later
became cancerous was not usual to the occupation of a lines-
man 7 The callous had formed as a result of several years of
continuous climbing. The court said: "An occupational disease
is one which is not only incident to an occupation, but the natural,
usual, and ordinary result thereof."8 In another decision ab-
scessed callouses on a woodcutter's hand were considered usual
-to his calling and therefore were not compensable.9  Although
the main reason for allowing recovery in Glover v. Fidelity &
Casualty Company" was the suddenness of the complication, an
added factor was that the court did not regard the ailment as
being usual to the occupation of a carpenter. The plaintiff had
worked four days in a dust filled room which caused an eye injury
to develop into "shingles" (Herpes Zoster). In reaching its conclu-
sion the court said: "If the conditions under which he [an em-
ployee] is required to work are so injurious to health as to pro-
duce symptoms ... on the second day it [the disease] cannot be
classed as occupational." 91
Under the present workmen's compensation statute of Loui-
siana, a more liberal construction on the part of the courts is
hardly to be expected. The existing limitations of the act simply
make further' expansion impossible. A broader legislative outlook
has been suggested by the workmen's compensation acts of those
85. Jackson v. Southern Kraft Corp., 183 So. 135 (La. App. 1938).
86. Faulkner v. Milner-Fuller, Inc., 154 So. 507 (La. App. 1934).
87. Harris v. Southern Carbon Co., Inc., 162 So. 430 (La. App. 1935).
88. 162 So. 430, 434 (La. App. 1935).
89. Robichaux v. Realty Operators, Inc., 191 So. 326 (La. App. 1939).
90. 10 So.(2d) 255 (La. App. 1942).
91. 10 So.(2d) 255, 258 (La. App. 1942).
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states in which the lawmakers have frankly faced the problem
of occupational disease and have met the need by comprehensive
coverage, or at least have permitted recovery for those diseases




WHO MAY OBJECT TO SUCH DONATIONS?
Article 1497 provdes that: "The donation inter vivos shall in
no case divest the donor of all his property; he must reserve for
himself enough for subsistence; if he does not do it, the donation
is null for the whole." This article was adopted from the Spanish
law. The.Spanish commentator Febrero states that the raison
d'6tre was public consideration.' The article did not appear
in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808, but was adopted in 1825.
In reflecting upon the significance of the article at the time of its
adoption the redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 said:
"We propose to re-establish this wise disposition which before
existed and which the code had abolished, wherefore we have
not learned," thus indicating that the article had been adopted
for the protection of the public.
2
Louisiana jurisprudence instances a various application of
this article. Insofar as the donor is concerned, his right to annul
such a donation has repeatedly been recognized.3 Furthermore,
1. II Febrero Novisimo (ed. by Tapia 1837) tit. IV, c. XXII, p. 462. ("La
razdn es porque ademds de quedarse el donante sin lo necesario para su
manutencion, se priva del derecho de testar, y se puede dar occas16n al
donatario para que maquine la muerte del donante con el fin de apoderarse
prontamente de sus bienes. Fuera de esto, y ademds del perjuicio que se causa
d las costumbres, no conviene en el orden p4blico que loe hombres sean
prddigos.") The reason is because, besides the fact that the donor remains
without the necessary means for his subsistence, he deprives himself of the
right of making a will and an occasion may be given to the donee to procure
the death of the donor in order to take possession of the estate. Besides this,
and besides the prejudice it causes to the mores, it is not convenient to the
public order that men be prodigious.
2. I Projet of the Civil Code of 1825 (1937) 207. ("Nous proposons de
rdtablir cette sage' disposition, que existait ci-devant, et que le code avait
abolie, on ne volt pas pourquoi.")
3. Lagrange v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302 (La. 1845); Beaulieu v. Monin, 50 La.
Ann. 732, 23 So. 937 (1898); Harris v. Wafer, 113 La. 822, 37 So. 768 (1904);
Nunge v. Cegretto, 3 Or. App. 39 (La. App. 1905); Rocques v. Freeman, 125
La. 60, 51 So. 68 (1909); Jaco v. Jaco, 129 La. 621, 56 So. 615 (1911); Succession
of Suarez, 131 La. 500, 59 So. 916 (1912); Kelly v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671
(1913); Tucker v. Angell, 1 La. App. 577 (1925); Armand v. Armand, 8 La. App.
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